It’s a strange world indeed where Jack Layton and George W. Bush are de facto allies, but we’re there now. And the weirdness doesn’t stop there. Not only does Bush have Layton’s support, but he’s also opposed by Stephen Harper, who thus far sides with the Russians.
I’m talking about Kosovo, of course, the U.S.-backed entity that Canada has not yet recognized, but that NDP leader Jack Layton says we should.
Canadian recognition of Kosovo is inevitable. Ottawa will not be among the final holdouts against the Kosovars’ recent unilateral declaration of independence. Any realistic observer accepts that Kosovo will not return to Serbian rule under any circumstances short of a world war won by the Russians. A short period of Canadian non-recognition, to protest the idea of unilateral secession, will end with Canada lining up with most other western countries in acquiescing to the new state.
The international faultlines laid bare by the Kosovo issue may be predictable but they are nevertheless extraordinary. A combination of the U.S., the majority of its European allies, Muslim countries, and most secessionist movements worldwide have welcomed the new state. Nations targeted by secessionist movements, like Canada, China, Russia, and Spain are united in withholding recognition but have little else in common. Each capital decides its position on Kosovo based on its own political realities and not according to the merits of the situation in the Balkans itself.
Nothing unusual about that, except that the consequences in this case could easily get out of hand. The idea promoted by Kosovar politicians and their supporters that their declaration of independence is a one-off that will not serve as a precedent anywhere else is crazy, and I’m not sure whom they expect to believe it.
A formal political split between Albanians and Serbs was unavoidable after so much bloodshed, but the terms of the divorce are narrow and unreasonable. Clear U.S. support for Kosovan independence made any other outcome impossible and left Serbs with no negotiating position. It is, however, a serious error to attempt to “solve” Kosovo in isolation, without taking into account the rights and aspirations of surrounding communities and nations.
This ham-handed territorial surgery leaves the whole region vulnerable to competing claims, which the international community, such as it is, has signed away the legitimacy to resolve. Secessionists in Europe and elsewhere now claim quite reasonably that those who support Kosovan independence can have no principled objections to Albanians in Macedonia doing the same thing, or Serbs in Bosnia, or Russians and Ukrainians in Romanian-backed Moldova, for that matter.
Nonsense, say Kosovo’s proponents. This is a unique situation—a martyred, isolated people gaining independence from the last outpost of a genocidal regime. Under NATO and EU guidance, the new state will respect minority rights and develop along modern, democratic lines.
The only problem is that this is complete garbage. No one can dispute the crimes of Yugoslavia’s late president, Slobodan Milosevic, but what is often forgotten in the Kosovo narrative is decades of Albanian suppression and oppression of the Serbian community. Serb numbers in Kosovo decreased steadily as a result, from near-parity 60 years ago to less than 10 per cent today. And NATO’s defeat of Serbia in 1999 led to mass expulsions of Serbs and the systematic desecration of Serb historical and religious sites, with western forces well aware of what was going on.
The new state’s government is in the hands of veterans of the now-disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army, an organization responsible for murdering hundreds or even thousands of civilians. Such leaders are unlikely to suddenly discover the virtues of protecting minority rights or promoting the rule of law, though they have the jargon down when dealing with western media.
What an independent Kosovo represents is not the triumph of democracy and human rights but an important victory for Albanian nationalism in its long struggle against its Serb counterpart. In international politics, who is stronger almost always matters more than who is right, and nowhere is this more evident than in the Balkans.
The question is: what happens next? Does the seceding body automatically have a right to maintain its territorial integrity? There are still a few districts in the new country of Kosovo where Serbs form the majority. If Serbia is divisible, why not Kosovo? And if both are divisible, why not accept a similar independence declaration by “Republika Srpska,” the Serbian political entity in Bosnia & Hercegovina? The fact that this will not happen anytime soon has nothing to do with justice or self-determination. The real reason is that the U.S. and its European allies see the Serbs as political and strategic adversaries, closely connected to the Russians.
What remains to be seen is how hard the Russians and their allies are prepared to push back—and what that will mean for the Balkans and for the rest of us.
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